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Distrust of Democracy
DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES. By David B. Magleby.t Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1984. Pp. xi, 270. $25.00.1
Reviewed by Richard Briffault*
The current rediscovery of state constitutions has had a singular and
curious feature: it has been focused largely on state constitutional provi-
sions that are analogous, if not identical, to provisions of the United
States Constitution. Scholars and jurists have devoted their attention to
state protections of speech, state equal protection clauses, state privileges
against self-incrimination, and state proscriptions of cruel and unusual
punishments, and have developed interpretations of these texts that di-
verge from those adopted by the United States Supreme Court in con-
struing comparable federal constitutional provisions.1 These attempts to
play state variations on federal constitutional themes have not been
matched by a similar degree of interest in those elements of state consti-
tutions that are not paralleled in the federal constitution. And yet many
state constitutions make extensive departures from the federal "model,"
particularly in the design of the structure and processes of government.
A striking innovation found in many state constitutions is in the role
of citizens in the process of legislation. The United States has a represen-
tative government: citizens elect representatives who then run the gov-
ernment. The formal lawmaking role of the citizens is exhausted by the
election of representatives. 2 By contrast, virtually every state provides
t Assistant Professor of Political Science, Brigham Young University. A.B. 1973, University
of Utah; M.A. 1974, Ph.D. 1979, University of California at Berkeley.
t Hereinafter citations to page number only refer to this book.
* Associate Professor of Law, Columbia University. A.B. 1974, Columbia; J.D. 1977,
Harvard.
1. E.g., Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L.
REv. 489 (1976); Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62
VA. L. REv. 873 (1976); Wright, In Praise of State Courts: Confessions of a Federal Judge, 11
HASTINS CONST. L.Q. 165 (1984); Developments in the Law-The Interpretation of State Constitu-
tional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1324 (1982). For additional sources on state bills of rights, see id.
at 1378 n.20.
2. The only potential exception to this otherwise absolute statement is provided by article V of
the United States Constitution, which, among alternative procedures, authorizes the calling of a
"convention for proposing amendments" and the use of state conventions for the ratification of
proposed amendments. In light of the extraordinary nature of constitutional revision as compared to
the process of ordinary lawmaking and given the paucity of conventions under article V, this excep-
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for some measure of direct citizen involvement in lawmaking. Nearly all
states require popular approval of constitutional amendments.3 Most
state constitutions require voter approval before the state may issue
debt.4 Half the states allow a relatively small group of citizens to sus-
pend the operation of any new law pending its submission to and ap-
proval by voters in a referendum.5  And almost two dozen states
authorize citizens to initiate legislation directly, that is, to draft proposals
that are then placed on the ballot and, if approved by the electorate,
become law.
6
Voter-initiated legislation-"the initidtive"-is a product of the
turn-of-the-century Progressive movement. The Progressives believed
that party bosses, political machines, and special interests had seduced
representative institutions away from serving the public interest. Late
nineteenth century politics, like the marketplace of that era, was believed
to be in the grip of powerful and rapacious combinations. Much as anti-
trust law was designed to break the economic power of these combina-
tions and restore free competition, the initiative, with the allied reforms
of the direct primary, the popular election of Senators, the referendum,
and the recall, was intended to break the stranglehold these combinations
had on the political process by bringing the people directly into lawmak-
ing.7 "The people" would act only on behalf of the public as a whole, not
to advance selfish, private interests. Moreover, Progressives thought that
direct democracy would improve the people as well as their government.
Direct legislation would have an educational and social function.
Through involvement in government, people could learn about impor-
tant issues; they would discuss and debate them with each other; they
would develop civic virtue." Even today, proponents of the initiative,
who range across the ideological spectrum from Jack Kemp to Ralph
Nader, assert that direct democracy can liberate politics from special in-
tion may be said to prove the rule stated in the text that the United States government is
representative.
3. See THE COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'Ts, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 1984-85, at 223 (1984)
(table 2) (voter ratification of constitutional amendments proposed by the legislature required in all
states except Delaware) [hereinafter cited as BOOK OF THE STATES].
4. See A. HEINS, CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS AGAINST STATE DEBT 11-12 (1963); J.
MAXWELL & J. ARONSON, FINANCING STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 207-08 (3d ed. 1977).
5. See pp. 38-39 (table 3.1).
6. See iad
7. See R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 257-68 (1955).
8. See pp. 21, 24, 28; Munro, Introductory, in THE INITIATIVE REFERENDUM AND RECALL 1,
22-24 (W. Munro ed. 1912). For a contemporary statement of the same philosophy, see Legislature
v. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d 658, 690, 669 P.2d 17, 39, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781, 803-04 (1983) (Richardson,
J., dissenting) ("The most effective way to increase public interest in political issues is to assure that





terest groups, reduce voter malaise, and energize the electorate.9
David Magleby says they are wrong. In his book, Direct Legislation:
Voting on Ballot Propositions in the United States, he asserts that the initi-
ative, in practice, has fallen far short of the original reformers' expecta-
tions, and that use of the initiative actually has harmed the political
process by weakening political parties and legislatures and by accelerat-
ing the growth of single-issue politics. Rather than giving power to the
people, the initiative, he contends, has been taken over by special interest
groups and has reinforced their strength.' 0
Magleby develops two lines of attack. The heart of his book is an
effort to study the initiative in the light of empirical research rather than
civics rhetoric." Magleby uses survey and aggregate data from leading
initiative states-California, Florida, Massachusetts, and Washington-
as well as national surveys, to examine how the direct legislation process
actually works. Focusing on how measures get on the ballot, who votes,
and the factors that affect how people cast their ballots, he finds that the
initiative process is structured to favor the well-organized and well-
heeled, to fence out minorities and the politically weak, and to produce
unreasoned election results. Although his conclusions are not free from
doubt, he makes a powerful case and provides a valuable addition to the
store of knowledge on how the initiative works.
The second component of Magleby's book is a more theoretical
comparison of direct and representative democracy, in which he finds
that direct legislation is inherently unsatisfactory.12 His conclusions here
9. See Voter Initiative Constitutional Amendment, 1977. Hearings on S. Re 67 Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 90-102
(1977) (testimony of Ralph Nader). Jack Kemp has stated: "The time is right. . . for the United
States to take the lead in a fresh global wave of democratization that demonstrates the efficiency of
government forms that rest on the wisdom of ordinary citizens-The most fundamental change we
could make. . . is to provide for a national initiative . J. KEMP, AN AMERICAN RENAIs-
SANCE 189 (1979).
10. Although Magleby's title refers broadly to "ballot propositions," his book is concerned only
with one type of ballot proposition, the initiative. Initiatives, which involve the enactment of meas-
ures through petition and popular vote, are distinctive among ballot propositions in that the legisla-
ture plays no role at all in the drafting, consideration, or enactment of such measures. Other
categories of ballot propositions involve a combination of legislative and plebiscitary actions. A
referendum occurs when the legislature has passed a law but petitioners have been able to gather
enough signatures to suspend the new law pending its special submission to the voters. See p. 402;
supra note 5 and accompanying text. The remaining ballot propositions are measures which under
state law must be approved by the voters after passage by the legislature before they can be consid-
ered enacted. Typically, these consist of state constitutional amendments and bond issues. See p.
402; supra notes 34 and accompanying text. Although some of Magleby's statistics concern ballot
propositions generally, he discusses noninitiative ballot propositions only in passing, and the focus of
his analysis is on the initiative. Consistent with his approach, this review will focus also on the
initiative.
11. See pp. 35-179.
12. See pp. 180-200.
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are far less compelling, and largely unsupported by his empirical re-
search. Ironically, although his discussion of direct democracy is well-
informed by an understanding of its defects in practice, his analysis of
legislatures is at the abstract level of the textbook model. When direct
legislation "in the field" is set against an idealized construct of the legis-
lative process, it is bound to fall short.
Indeed, to proceed by contrasting direct and representative democ-
racy may miss the point. We do not have to choose between the initiative
and the legislature: in twenty-three states we have both. In these states
the legislature and the initiative not only coexist but interact in a system
of lawmaking. 13 The real issue is how well they work together, or, given
that even in initiative states government remains largely representative,
whether the initiative corrects some of the defects of the legislative pro-
cess. Magleby does not examine these questions directly. But the evi-
dence suggests that the initiative may work well with the legislature and
that direct democracy may enhance the representativeness of representa-
tive government.
The first two parts of this Review summarize the main points of
Magleby's critique of the initiative process and present additional empiri-
cal evidence, including data gleaned from his book, that may take some
of the sting out of his criticisms. The next part analyzes Magleby's more
theoretical comparison of the initiative with representative democracy.
Differing from Magleby, I find that the legislature is afflicted by flaws
similar in kind to those that he asserts mark direct democracy. The final
portion of the Review attempts to present a view of the initiative as part
of the system of representative government in which direct legislation
remedies some of the legislature's shortcomings and serves as a fitting
complement to the legislative process.
1.
The key to understanding the workings of any legislative body is an
appreciation of who controls the agenda, who is able to vote, and what
elements influence the voting decision. This is as true for the electorate-
as-legislature as it is for the state assembly. The most valuable element of
Magleby's book is his multi-state examination of these mechanics in the
context of direct legislation.
Initiative measures get before the voters only if they qualify for the
ballot. Qualification requires that the proponents of an initiative obtain
signatures on petitions of a certain number of voters, usually equal to a




percentage of the votes cast in the preceding general or gubernatorial
election. Signature requirements range from a low in North Dakota of
2% of the voting-age population to a high in Wyoming of 15% of the
preceding gubernatorial vote. The median requirement nationwide is 8%
of the vote in the last gubernatorial election. 14 As Magleby points out,
"The fact that states have set their signature threshold requirements in
percentage terms rather than as a set number of valid signatures has af-
fected the practice of direct legislation .... ,,15 When California
adopted its 8% requirement in 1914, that threshold could be crossed
with about 30,000 names. 16 Today, 630,000 signatures are required.1
7
Such an undertaking requires enormous amounts of time, energy, and
wealth. At this first critical hurdle, "most citizens lack the organiza-
tional strength and financial resources" to get on the ballot.18 Indeed,
although California since 1970 has witnessed an extraordinary level of
initiative activity, only 12% of proposed initiatives have surmounted the
signature threshold and actually appeared on the ballot.19
To overcome the difficulty of securing a ballot position, initiative
proponents have turned for assistance to the "initiative industry"-pro-
fessional "petition management" firms that specialize in designing attrac-
tive initiative proposals and gathering the requisite signatures. These
professional signature collectors mobilize armies of workers trained in
the arts of cajoling the public into signing on the dotted line. The tech-
niques these solicitors use at shopping centers and street corners are
more those of the pitchman than the civic educator. The solicitor sum-
marizes the initiative in the briefest and most appealing way possible.
Voters are urged to "lower taxes" or "stop corrupt practices" by signing
the petition. Under tight time constraints to gather the required signa-
tures, the solicitors have no interest in debating the merits of the measure
with citizens or even in enabling potential signers to read and consider
the petition carefully. Rather, solicitors appeal to the voters' sense of
fairness; solicitors tell wavering voters that signing the petition does not
mean that they favor the initiative but simply helps get the measure on
the ballot so that the public can vote on it. One solicitor apparently ob-
tained great results by asking people to sign because it was his birthday.
Others employ less innocent methods, such as "dodger cards," which
14. See p. 41.
15. Id.
16. See id.
17. In California's most recent gubernatorial election, 7,876,698 people voted. See BooK OF
THE STATES, supra note 3, at 210 (table 12). Eight percent of that figure is 630,136.
18. P. 182.
19. See p. 67 (table 4.1).
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cover up the text of a measure so that voters cannot see undesirable or
confusing provisions, or outright forgery of signatures of voter names
drawn from the telephone book.20
Petition firms usually charge about one dollar per signature.21 In
California, this can make the cost to qualify a proposition for the ballot
as much as $1 million,2 2 especially when qualification expenses continue
after the signature circulation stage. Appropriate state officials must val-
idate the signatures, and opponents may question the signatures' authen-
ticity or the qualifications of the signatories. Further legal challenges
may concern the formal sufficiency of the petition proposal or the consti-
tutionality of the measure. After recounting these costs, Magleby con-
cludes that
to meet signature thresholds, legal challenges, and campaign costs,
[initiative] sponsors must have substantial political resources
(money and manpower). Organized interests clearly have an ad-
vantage over most individuals in overcoming these hurdles. Thus,
if a test for the popular sovereignty of initiatives and referendums
is equal access in placing an issue on the ballot, the initiative and
referendum fail.
23
Magleby's thesis that structural barriers impede popular participa-
tion in direct legislation applies to voter turnout as well as ballot access.
Although proponents treat the initiative as a means of realizing the "will
of the people," in practice "the people" do not engage in direct legisla-
tion-voters do-and the two groups are far from coextensive. Recent
voter turnout data from the initiative states of California, Massachusetts,
and Washington reveal that only 50%-60% of the population votes at
all 24 and that between 8% and 17% of those who do vote do not cast
20. See generally pp. 61-65 (describing signature collecting techniques). See also Grant v.
Meyer, 741 F.2d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir. 1984) (discussing abuses by petition circulators).
21. Seep. 64.
22. See id. Recently, petition managers have developed new techniques, including contacting
potential signers by direct-mail. Direct-mail is roughly twice as expensive as face-to-face signature
collection, but it allows proponents to target persons who are likely to be receptive to an initiative
and who may contribute to the campaign. See pp. 64-65. The first initiative to qualify entirely by
mail was a 1980 proposal to reduce and index California state income tax rates. The qualification
cost was just over $2 million, but an equal amount was received in contributions. See A. RAnUSHKA
& P. RYAN, THE TAX REVOLT 159-60 (1982). For an example of direct-mail in another initiative,
see Assembly v. Deukmejian, 30 Cal. 3d 638, 646 n.6, 639 P.2d 939, 944 n.6, 180 Cal. Rptr. 297, 302
n.6 (1982) ("slightly more than half" of signatures on petitions to subject legislature's reapportion-
ment plan to referendum gathered through direct-mail effort).
23. P. 58.
24. In California, voter turnout for the period of 1970-1982 ranged from a low of 44% in 1974
and 1978 to a high of 61% in 1972, with an average of 51%. In Massachusetts during the same
years the range was 47% (1974) to 63% (1972), with a 12-year average of 54%. In Washington,
over the period from 1960 to 1982, the low turnout was 39% (1978) and the high was 73% (1960




ballots on initiative questions.25 The low turnout is exacerbated in Cali-
fornia where initiatives may be presented to the voters at primaries and
special elections. Voter turnout for such special elections has ranged
from 24% to 30%, thereby permitting roughly one-sixth of the electorate
to enact an initiative into law.
26
Furthermore, voter turnout and initiative drop-off are not scattered
randomly throughout the population but are correlated with income, ed-
ucation, and race. The poor, the working class, those without a college
education, and nonwhites are less likely to vote than are other citizens,
and even if they do get to the polls they are far less likely than others to
vote on ballot propositions.27 In one California election, for example,
nearly 50% of persons with less than an eighth-grade education who
voted for Governor failed to vote on an initiative measure.2 8 In that elec-
tion, voters who had never gone to college cast 42% of the votes for
Governor but only 33% of the votes on the proposition.29 Analyzing a
dozen elections in California over an eight year period, Magleby found
that the less educated were significantly underrepresented in most initia-
tive contests but not in candidate races.30 In sum, "Compared with vot-
ers generally [and the population as a whole], people who typically vote
on propositions are disproportionately well educated, affluent, and
white." 3'
One significant cause of this tendency to exclude the poor and the
uneducated is not hard to find; the complexity of ballot proposition
wording prevents many citizens from understanding the initiative. 32 Ini-
tiative measures are more than mere voter opinion polls; they are in-
tended to make law. As a result they often are written in technical, legal
language with cross-references to other provisions of law and use terms
of art impenetrable to the lay person. One of the most provocative por-
tions of Magleby's book is his assessment of the readability of such ballot
measures. Magleby applied three academic readability formulas33 to pro-
25. Average drop-offin voting for initiatives during 1970-1982 was 14% in California and 17%
in Massachusetts. Average drop-off in initiative voting in Washington from 1960 to 1982 was 11%.
See id.
26. See p. 88.
27. See pp. 103-11.
28. See p. 109.
29. See id.
30. A similar study of the 1978 Florida election in which a governor's race and eight proposi-
tions were on the ballot disclosed that less educated voters, nonwhites, and blue collar workers
consistently were underrepresented on ballot propositions but not in the vote for Governor. See pp.
112-13.
31. P. 145.
32. See p. 121.
33. The formulas measure word difficulty, sentence length, complexity, and conceptual diffi-
culty of the text. See pp. 118-19, 207-08.
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positions that appeared on the ballots of four states between 1970 and
1979. He found most measures in California and Oregon were readable
at approximately the eighteenth grade level, that is, an average reader
would need a bachelor's degree plus two additional years of education to
understand the proposal.34 The ballot descriptions in Massachusetts and
Rhode Island were only somewhat more readable. They required read-
ing at the fifteenth grade level, or third year of college.35 Given the edu-
cational attainments of the citizens of these states, it is unlikely that more
than one-fifth of the adults in California, Massachusetts, Oregon, and
Rhode Island could read and understand the ballot questions.36 Voters
who do not understand the issues before them may simply abstain and in
effect delegate the decision to the better educated members of the electo-
rate, who have no obligation or interest to act as representatives of the
"drop-offs."
Magleby's analysis of the voting behavior of those citizens who actu-
ally cast ballots extends his negative picture of initiative voting. If one
reaction to the inability to understand ballot proposition language is to
abstain, an alternative response is to attempt to garner the necessary in-
formation from other sources and vote anyway. Several states concerned
about the problem of voter ignorance have sought to educate voters by
publishing handbooks that describe the initiative. These materials pro-
vide the ballot title, a summary of the proposition, usually prepared by
the state attorney general or secretary of state, and arguments for and
against each measure, usually submitted by the proposition's sponsors
and opponents. The handbooks are mailed to every registered voter
shortly before each election in which a statewide proposition is on the
ballot. 37
As Magleby notes, "Voters' handbooks constitute one of the largest
governmental efforts at both mass communication and civic educa-
tion."' 38 The costs of publication and mailing range from over $350,000
per election in Massachusetts to over $2 million per election in Califor-
nia. 39 Some researchers have found that the handbooks enjoy significant
readership and are an important source of information for initiative vot-
ers;40 Magleby sharply disagrees. Applying the same academic readabil-
ity tests that he uses to test the ballot propositions, Magleby concludes
34. See p. 119.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See pp. 38-39, 56, 136.
38. See p. 138.
39. See id.




that the handbooks are often less comprehensible than the propositions
themselves41 and that more than two-thirds of those who receive hand-
books cannot use them effectively. 42
With the voter handbook of limited utility, and with the factors that
are usually of great importance in candidate elections-party affiliation
and the candidate's personality and record-absent, voters are largely
thrown back on the mass media for the information necessary to make a
knowledgeable decision about an initiative. This tends to result in two
types of proposition voting. A handful of measures are like Proposition
13, California's property tax reduction scheme. These initiatives are the
subject--or cause--of considerable controversy and heated contests.
The news media attend to these as much as to candidate races and their
campaigns may involve large advertising expenditures. Either because
the issues are fairly straightforward or because of extensive media cover-
age or advertising campaigns, voters become relatively well-informed and
can vote on the merits. A Los Angeles Times exit poll found that 89% of
the voters believed they understood the provisions of Proposition 13.
43
But few ballot measures are as salient to the voters as Proposition
13. Many initiative proposals are difficult to comprehend and involve
matters about which voters have little independent knowledge and few
fixed beliefs. Extensive media coverage is unavailable for most ballot
propositions, and few voters have the ability or incentive to invest the
time and energy necessary to study the issues and cast an informed bal-
lot. Proposition campaign advertising is largely sloganeering, providing,
at best, a radically simplified analysis of complex and difficult questions
and, often, distorted or deceptive portrayals of the initiative. As a result,
voters, especially the less educated and the poor, often misunderstand
proposals and may vote against their own interests or beliefs. Indeed,
Magleby suggests that miscast votes are not uncommon, that many peo-
ple cast votes for the position opposite to that for which they think they
are voting.44 For the less salient measures and the less knowledgeable
voters, then, "voting becomes a form of electoral roulette" 45 rather than
an informed and reasoned lawmaking process.
41. See pp. 138-39. Citizens need a reading level equivalent to that of a third-year college
student in order to understand the arguments printed in the handbooks. Id.
42. Magleby's research on recent California elections found that only 13% to 33% of the voters
list the handbook as a source of information. Moreover, as might be expected, handbook usage
correlates significantly with education: only 7% of those with less than an eighth-grade education
mentioned that they used the handbook, but 44% of those with advanced degrees indicated that the
handbook provided some information about the propositions. See pp. 136-37.
43. See p. 141.




Although voting on less controversial measures may take place "in
an informational vacuum, '46 that rarely results in passage of the initia-
tive proposal. Voters appear to be conservative, with a small "c." A lack
of information about an initiative proposal or uncertainty about its ef-
fects leads voters to vote in the negative. Even one-sided campaign
spending in favor of an initiative may fail to overcome voter caution or
doubt. Over a thirty-year period, in more than half the cases in which a
proposition's proponents outspent its opponents by a factor of two-to-
one, the proposition still failed to pass.47 On the other hand, only two
out of fifteen proposals were enacted in the face of such one-sided nega-
tive spending.4
8
High levels of negative campaign spending can plant seeds of uncer-
tainty and sow confusion, especially when not matched by comparable
advertising in support of the measure. The most successful negative
campaigns play to the voter's predisposition to vote "no" by suggesting
that an initiative that seems desirable on its face will have negative side
effects or consequences unintended by the proponents. Opponents may
suggest that they are sympathetic to the aims of the proposal but contend
that the specific method provided in the initiative will backfire or be inef-
fective.49 An initiative that starts with broad but thin support often fal-
ters when extensive negative spending casts doubt on the measure and
causes voter uncertainty about the proposal's merits or effects. With
campaigning, as with ballot qualification, the advantage lies with the
well-organized and well-financed, who can mobilize multi-million dollar
opposition campaigns. 50
This voter reluctance to pass ballot measures is so strong that even
endorsements by "elite" groups-leading newspapers, Chambers of
Commerce, labor federations, Common Cause, and taxpayers' associa-
tions-cannot always secure passage of an initiative. Although Magleby
found that voters often followed the positions taken by elite groups when
46. Id.
47. See p. 148 (table 8.1).
48. See id.
49. A measure to restrict air pollution was lauded for its goals but attacked as a threat to jobs; a
proposal to require separate smoking and nonsmoking sections in public places was characterized as
a government intrusion into people's lives; a proposal to replace a proportional with a graduated
income tax was characterized as likely to result in higher taxes. See pp. 168-70.
50. An initiative with adverse affects on a special interest group can face powerful resistance
from the affected group. For instance, California's Proposition 5 (1978), requiring nonsmoking sec-
tions in public areas, was ahead in an early poll 57% to 38% but received only 46% of the vote
following an opposition campaign in which the tobacco industry spent $6.4 million-more than the
combined sum spent by all the candidates for Governor in the same election-while proponents
mustered only $700,000 in support. See p. 213; Lowenstein, Campaign Spending and Ballot Proposi-





those elites were unanimous, elites and voters frequently disagreed, and
in 80% of elite-voter disagreements, the elites supported the ballot pro-
posal and the voters said "no.
51
Thus, except for those initiatives that, like Proposition 13, are well-
publicized or that concern subjects on which the voters have strong opin-
ions, such as the death penalty, it is far harder for proponents to pass a
proposition than for opponents to defeat one. Proponents must convince
voters to change the status quo. Even substantial affirmative spending is
often unable to do this, while opposition campaigns strive to create con-
fusion, reinforce uncertainty, and suggest the wisdom, "When in doubt,
vote no." In short, Magleby sees initiative voting as a mix of unin-
formed, confused choices biased by voter caution and well-financed nega-
tive special interest campaigns that defeat whatever desirable measures
may have managed to get on the ballot.
II.
Magleby's indictment of the direct legislative process, though often
compelling, at times reaches too far and exceeds his evidence. Indeed,
his own research demonstrates that structural barriers to citizen partici-
pation in the initiative process can be, and have been, surmounted, that
turnout for initiatives is often comparable with that for other state elec-
tions, and that the voters often reach decisions congruent with the inter-
ests of the majority.
Although Magleby's analysis of the high hurdles tending to limit
access to the initiative agenda to special interest organizations is difficult
to refute, a significant number of ballot measures have been the product
of forces outside the power elite who are not usually successful at the
ordinary politics of working the lobbies of the State House. In the last
decade, such outside groups have qualified proposals to control hand-
guns, restrict indoor smoking, ban nonreturnable beverage containers,
limit nuclear power plants, and legalize the possession and use of mari-
juana.5 2 Although in a sense all ballot measures are due to the work of
some "interest group" because an organizational effort is necessary to get
on the ballot, these proposals plainly were not attributable to the regular
players in the game of legislation. Indeed, established groups often
strongly opposed these proposals and many of these measures would
never have received serious legislative consideration without the
initiative.5 3
51. See pp. 152-53.
52. See pp. 74-75, 209-10, 213.
53. One rough indicator of the attitudes of the more powerful special interest groups is their
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According to one survey of sixty years of initiative activity in the
state of Washington, roughly one-quarter of initiative proposals came not
from the usual special interest groups but from "anomic or short-term
interest groups" that came together spontaneously to promote or combat
a particular policy proposal and disappeared soon after the election.54
Indeed, the most successful initiative drive in the history of the state was
started and led by a thirty-two-year-old furniture salesman who was so
upset by a salary increase the legislature voted itself that he formed his
own group and collected nearly 700,000 signatures on a petition to cut
the pay raise.55 The record of the last decade suggests that similarly
anomic groups have had some success and may account for one-fourth of
recent initiatives in California, where the financial and organizational
barriers to ballot qualification are greater than in Washington. 56 The
initiative process may be dominated by the rich and the well-organized
but it is not their exclusive preserve, and it is far from clear, the signature
hurdle notwithstanding, that the ballot is less accessible to citizens out of
the usual channels of power than is the legislature.
On voter turnout, Magleby is convincing that only a portion of the
people participate and that participation rates are skewed toward the up-
per end of the socioeconomic scale. Here, too, however, a close examina-
tion of the data tempers Magleby's criticism. In computing the "drop-
off" rates, Magleby compares the rate of voting on ballot measures with
the rate of voting for the candidate contests with the highest turnouts-
Presidential and gubernatorial elections.57 In making that comparison
he found a drop-off rate of 8%-17%.58 A more appropriate standard of
comparison, however, is voter participation in legislative races, because
the function of the initiative voter is analogous to that of a state legisla-
tor, not a governor. In California, the drop-off rates for initiatives and
campaign expenditures. The proponents of the California handgun, antismoking, beverage
container, and nuclear power plant initiatives were all heavily outspent by their opponents. Indeed,
the negative spending campaigns on these measures ranked first, second, fourth, and sixth, respec-
tively, of all California ballot proposition expenditures between 1954 and 1982. See p. 209 (appendix
E). Industry and labor groups particularly opposed the nuclear power and antismoking initiatives.
See Lowenstein, supra note 50, at 526, 537-38. Proponents far outspent opponents on the marijuana
decriminalization proposal, but the amounts involved were quite small. See pp. 209-10 (appendix E).
54. See Bone & Benedict, Perspectives on Direct Legislation: Washington State's Experience
1914-1973, 28 W. POL. Q. 330, 332-35 (1975).
55. See C. SHELDON & F. WEAVER, POLITICIANS, JUDGES AND THE PEOPLE: A STUDY IN
CITIZENS' PARTICIPATION (1980).
56. See supra note 52 and accompanying text; see also Lee, California, in REFERENDUM 87, 118
(D. Butler & A. Ranney eds. 1978) ("grass-roots organizations will continue to compete successfully
in the initiative process with relatively modest financial resources"); Price, The Initiative: A Com-
parative State Analysis and Reassessment of a Western Phenomenon, 28 W. POL. Q. 243, 260-61
(1975) (asserting that the initiative process serves a useful purpose for citizens' groups).
57. See supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text.




state assembly races were almost identical.59 In addition, the drop-off for
initiatives was not much greater than for congressional contests in Wash-
ington60 and Massachusetts.
61
Furthermore, the drop-off rates for initiatives compare favorably
against those in two other areas-lesser executive officials and other bal-
lot measures. In Massachusetts, for example, the voting rate on initia-
tives was only slightly less than that for state Treasurer and nearly
identical to that for state Auditor.62 In Washington, the drop-off for
those two offices considered in the aggregate was actually higher than the
rate for initiatives; at least one other state office had a drop-off rate more
than double that for initiatives.63 Voters in California and Washington
also considered other ballot measures, such as constitutional amend-
ments and bond issues, that are passed by the legislatures and then re-
ferred to the electorate for their approval. Magleby's data show that
participation was higher for initiatives than for these measures sponsored
by the legislature. 4
Finally, for well-publicized or hotly contested propositions the drop-
off was relatively small. Even when buried at the middle or end of a long
ballot, such initiatives drew a high turnout. As Magleby notes, "[Vioters
searched the ballot for the controversial propositions and voted on them
"65 Thus, although turnout and drop-off figures must disappoint
direct democracy partisans, they can stand comparison with voting on
lesser candidate races, and initiative voting is quite high in certain cases.
Magleby's conclusion that direct legislation often results in unin-
formed, unreasoned decisions seems largely on the mark, yet it is not
clear what this adds to his indictment of the initiative process. First,
given the asymmetry in initiative voting, unreasoned votes may do little
long-term harm. As Magleby demonstrates, voters usually vote "no"-
only one-third of citizen-initiated measures pass. Although these nega-
tive votes may be uninformed or irrational-that is, the "no" voter may
vote against her own interests without realizing it-no new law is thereby
enacted; rather, the status quo is left unchanged. The uninformed voter
59. The drop-off rate for both was 8%. See p. 84 (table 5.2); Lee, supra note 56, at 108.
60. The drop-off rate was 11% for initiatives and 8% for congressional races. See p. 85 (table
5.4).
61. The drop-off rate was 17% for initiatives and 11% for congressional races. See p. 84 (table
5.3).
62. The drop-off rates for those two elective state offices were 14% and 16% respectively. See
id.
63. See id. (table 5.4). The drop-off was 11% for initiatives and for Treasurer, 13% for Audi-
tor, and 28% for Superintendent of Public Instruction.
64. See pp. 84-85 (tables 5.2, 5.4); Lee, supra note 56, at 108.
65. P. 94.
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might have been better off had the initiative passed, but after the initia-
tive's failure she is not worse off than before the election. Moreover, the
electorate or the legislature can still consider the defeated measure at a
later date.
Second, the existence of this "negative bias" in voting somewhat un-
dercuts the contention that initiative voters vote irrationally. If, as
Magleby contends, special interest groups have de facto dominance over
ballot qualification, the edge in financing expensive media campaigns,
and a more sophisticated understanding of the technical legal language of
propositions, then the most reasonable step for most voters to take is to
vote "no."' 66 Finally, for some initiatives, voters were well-informed, un-
derstood the proposition's terms, and voted intelligently according to
their beliefs.
67
For Magleby the full extent of the flaws inherent in direct legislation
66. This bias does not seem to extend to ballot proposals submitted by the legislature. Of ballot
propositions voted on between 1898 and 1979, the public approved only 34% of citizen-initiated
measures, but passed more than 60% of proposals that had originated in the legislature and needed
voter approval in order to become law. See pp. 73 (table 4.4), 167. There is no evidence that the
legislative proposals were written in more comprehensible language or that they affected areas of
unusual voter interest or knowledge. In fact, the legislative proposals "have been largely of a techni-
cal and noncontroversial nature." Lee, supra note 56, at 91. The much higher approval rate appears
to be a reflection of voter perception of the legislature as on average a more trustworthy source of
lawmaking than private citizen groups. Magleby's own analysis suggests that the public is right.
The electorate seems to be able to make a reasonable discrimination among ballot propositions,
adopting most of those certified by the legislature as in the public interest while rejecting most of
those that are the product of the special-interest dominated initiative process.
67. See pp. 141, 143 (lack of confusion concerning open-housing referendum), 211-12 (well-
defined voter opinions on death penalty, political reform, marijuana, open-housing proposals, and
Massachusetts Equal Rights Amendment).
Recently, the courts in initiative states have become more active in trying to upgrade the quality
of voter understanding. The Florida and California Supreme Courts have become embroiled in con-
troversy over the so-called "single subject rule"-the requirement in the constitutions of those states
that initiatives be limited to a single subject. State supreme court justices who favor strict enforce-
ment of the rule hope that it will "minimize the risk of confusion and deception" to voters by making
an initiative proposal easier to understand. Brosnahan v. Eu, 31 Cal. 3d 1, 7, 641 P.2d 200, 203, 186
Cal. Rptr. 100, 103 (1982) (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting); see also Brosnahan v. Brown, 32
Cal. 3d 236, 266-68, 651 P.2d 274, 292-93, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30, 48-49 (1982) (Bird, C.J., dissenting)
(arguing that the single subject rule narrows the breadth of issues voters must consider and facilitates
informed decisions); Evans v. Firestone, 457 So. 2d 1351, 1357 (Fla. 1984) (Overton, J., concurring)
(noting that the rule helps focus voters' attention on relevant issues); Fine v. Firestone, 448 So. 2d
984, 995 (Fla. 1984) (McDonald, J., concurring) (favoring "fair notice" of a proposition's contents).
See generally Lowenstein, California Initiatives and the Single Subject Rule, 30 UCLA L. RExV. 936
(1983) (discussing the difficulty of developing an adequate definition of a "single subject" and urging
loose enforcement of the rule).
Even more dramatic than enforcing the single subject rule, the Florida Supreme Court recently
struck a proposition from the ballot because it had a misleading title and description. See Askew v.
Firestone, 421 So. 2d 151, 155-56 (Fla. 1982). The Oregon Supreme Court simply rewrote one title
it found misleading. See Wells v. Paulus, 296 Or. 338, 675 P.2d 482 (1984).
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can be perceived only by comparing direct with representative democ-
racy, a contrast he draws in the final chapter of his book.68 He makes
three claims. First, representative democracy is "generally structured to
facilitate . . a degree of access for all segments of the community" 69
unlike direct democracy, which effectively excludes "those without
plenty of money or an organizational base."' 70 Second, the legislative
process is designed to produce "deliberative, substantive, and rational"
outcomes, unlike the unreasoned nature of direct democratic decision
making.71 Finally, the legislature, as an institution, is more sensitive to
the interests of minorities. Elected representatives can accommodate and
support a numerical minority's intensely held views while direct democ-
racy involves no more than a counting of heads in which numerical mi-
norities will always lose.72
Unlike the predominantly empirical nature of his study of direct leg-
islation, Magleby's analysis of lawmaking by elected representatives is
unsupported by research evidence. Instead, his summary description is
largely a restatement of traditional pluralist theory coupled with an ide-
alized vision of the operation of the legislative process. Rather than en-
gage in an extensive critique, a few points may suffice to show how he
exaggerates the democratic nature of representative government and
overstates the comparative failings of direct legislation.
It is ironic that Magleby, who is so astute in recognizing the hidden
barriers to access to the initiative process for the nonaffluent and unor-
ganized, should be so inattentive to the same barriers to access to repre-
sentative government. Private wealth and special interests dominate the
financing of candidate elections as well as initiative petition drives and
ballot proposition campaigns. 73 Inequalities of wealth and organization
influence both the outcome of elections and the postelection behavior of
legislators. 74 Indeed, heavy affirmative spending seems to be even more
effective in candidate elections than in initiative balloting. 75 More signif-
icantly, campaign contributions influence the conduct of government. A





72. See pp. 184-85.
73. See D. ADAMANY & D. AGREE, POLITICAL MONEY (1975); H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING
THE 1980 ELECTION (1983); L. BERG, H. HAHN & J. SCHMIDHAUSER, CORRUPTION IN THE AMER-
ICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM (1976); E. DREW, POLITICS AND MONEY (1983); Briffault, The Federal
Election Campaign Act and the 1980 Election, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 2083 (1984).
74. See Briffault, supra note 73, at 2100-02.
75. See id. at 2100 & n.86.
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geographic constituency, so that campaign contributions provide access
to the legislative agenda.76 Although voter turnout may be slightly lower
in initiative contests than in candidate elections, the number of Ameri-
cans who influence the political arena through financial contributions is
much more limited. That group-like the initiative electorate-is com-
posed disproportionately of persons of above-average income and educa-
tion.77 Magleby fails even to touch upon the role of private wealth and
special interest groups in setting the legislative agenda or determining
legislative outcomes. The problems of wealth and organizational limits
on access are common to both direct and representative government;
Magleby certainly makes no showing that the legislative process is less
skewed by campaign finance and special interest lobbying than is direct
democracy.
Magleby's claims about the deliberative nature of the legislative pro-
cess seem more plausible on the surface, but they, too, are overstated.
Legislators are expert specialists in lawmaking, equipped with staffs and
resources that help them reach informed decisions. They work through a
process of hearings, amendments, revisions, and debates that promotes
reasoned consideration of a bill. In short, as Magleby contends, the legis-
lative process is designed to foster deliberation.78
But, of course, the potential for deliberation does not ensure that
deliberation always occurs. In fact, much legislation is enacted without
the informed, thoughtful analysis or extensive consideration contem-
plated by the legislative ideal. Many state legislatures act on a significant
number of their bills in marathon sittings at the end of the legislative
session.79 According to one commentator, "The crush of end-of-session
business. . . buries state legislators in the closing weeks. ... In many
states it becomes impossible even to find bills." °80 In one session of the
New York Legislature, for example, 508 bills were passed in the last
three days the legislature met.81
Lack of deliberation is not reserved for the end of the session. One
California state senator entitled his political memoirs What Makes You
Think We Read the Bills? 82 and proceeded to explain:
76. See id. at 2100-01 & nn.87-89.
77. See id. at 2101 & n.92.
78. See pp. 184-88.
79. See Wahlke, Organization and Procedure, in STATE LEGISLATURES IN AMERICAN POLI-
TICS 147 (Am. Assembly ed. 1966).
80. Id. at 147.
81. See J. ZIMMERMAN, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF NEW YORK STATE 144 (1981).
One critic contends that "legislation by fatigue means that a trio-the governor, the speaker, and the
Senate president pro tempore-determine the bills to be enacted into law." Id. at 145.




Legislators consistently vote on legislation without under-
standing what is in it, especially when the final vote is taken.
Every legislator has his own system for judging how he will vote,
but reading the bill usually isn't part of the procedure, and listen-
ing to debate on the bill's merits certainly isn't either.83
Rather, most legislators usually abide by the decision of a party caucus,
follow the lead of influential members, or defer to the recommendations
of lobbyists and interest groups.8 4 That the legislative process has a
greater potential for deliberative decision making than does initiative vot-
ing is likely, but Magleby has simply posited the case for the legislature's
greater rationality; he certainly has not proven it.85
Magleby's third point, that legislatures are more sensitive to the in-
terests of minority groups than the initiative electorate, also has a logical
appeal. Other critics of direct democracy have made the same point.
8 6
Pluralist theorists argue that because legislatures represent so many dif-
ferent interests, building a legislative majority requires the formation of
coalitions among various minorities. Legislators deal with the broad
range of issues that come before government, so that minority groups
with differing intensities of preference on different issues may bargain
with other groups for their votes. This legislative log-rolling over a
broad agenda brings minorities into the process and ensures that the re-
sulting compromises will accommodate their interests. In contrast, the
initiative agenda is thin, presenting only a few isolated questions to the
electorate seriatim.87 Various groups in a statewide electorate cannot sit
down and bargain with each other, with one group pledging support on
one initiative in one year in exchange for support from another group on
83. Id. at 37-38.
84. See id. at 42-46. See generally J. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 81, at 123-57.
The New York Senate's "fast roll call" procedure provides an interesting commentary on legis-
lative "deliberation." When a fast roll call is in effect, a vote on the final passage of a bill is taken by
calling the names of only five senators in the 61-member body-the Temporary President, the Mi-
nority leader, and the first and last two senators on the alphabetically arranged senate roll-call list.
Every other senator is recorded as voting in the affirmative-even if silent or out of the chamber
when the vote is taken-unless the senator is present and expressly records himself or herself in the
negative. In one recent case, a highly controversial tax increase was passed on a predawn fast roll
call with 31 affirmative votes, the minimum number required for passage. Included in the majority
was a senator opposed to the bill who was in the hospital when the vote was taken. See Heimbach v.
State, 89 A.D.2d 138, 454 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1982).
85. Other critics of direct democracy join Magleby in emphasizing the comparative superiority
of the legislature for deliberative decision making. See Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 266-67,
651 P.2d 274, 292-93, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30, 48-49 (1982) (Bird, C.J., dissenting); Sager, Insular Majori-
ties Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 91 HARV. L.
REV. 1373 (1978).
86. E.g., Bell, The Referendum: Democracy's Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L. REV. 1
(1978).
87. See Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing Judicial
Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 175 (1978).
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another ballot proposition in the next year.88 In theory, then, it is rea-
sonable to believe that legislatures are more responsive to minority
groups than is the electorate as a whole.
Yet, as with Magleby's praise of legislative rationality, the greater
potential for attentiveness to minority groups has not always been
matched in practice. Indeed, it is difficult to argue that historically mi-
norities-in particular, blacks and other racial minorities---did all that
well in state legislatures. Racial discrimination was largely a product of
state legislative action, not initiative votes. Nor are the great advances of
minorities in recent decades attributable to state legislative action. The
initial successes of the civil rights movement were won in the courts or
on the streets. The legislatures resisted and delayed and became more
responsive only under extraordinary political and legal pressures. Even
today, in times of fiscal stringency, states may be more prone to cut pro-
grams that help minorities and the poor than those that serve more polit-
ically powerful groups.
At another level, the challenge to the initiative for lack of sensitivity
to minority interests is misguided; the initiative, like other devices of di-
rect democracy, was designed as a majoritarian tool, to be used when the
legislature failed to act on a program the majority desires.8 9 The appro-
priate question here is whether the initiative is more likely than the legis-
lature to be a source of measures that discriminate against minorities or
infringe upon the rights of the politically powerless. Without offering a
firm answer, I suggest that there are two institutions that tend to mitigate
the antiminority potential of direct legislation: the judiciary and the ini-
tiative process itself.
The electorate-as-legislature can no more infringe upon constitu-
tionally protected rights than can the representative legislature.
Although the courts frequently bestow rhetorical plaudits on direct de-
mocracy,90 they have not hesitated to invalidate initiative measures as
88. See id. at 182.
89. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
90. See, e.g., James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971) ("Provisions for referendums demon-
strate devotion to democracy .. "); Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 241, 651 P.2d 274, 277,
186 Cal. Rptr. 30, 33 (1982) ("[I]t is our solemn duty jealously to guard the sovereign people's
initiative power. . . . [We are required to resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of the exercise of
this precious right. '9 (emphasis in original); Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. Board
of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 219, 583 P.2d 1281, 1283, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 241 (1978) ("[T]he
power of initiative must be liberally construed. . . to promote the democratic process.") (quoting
San Diego Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205, 210 n.3, 529 P.2d 570, 572 n.3,
118 Cal. Rptr. 146, 148 n.3 (1974)); Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d
582, 591, 557 P.2d 473, 477, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 45 (1976) ("[T]he initiative and referendum ...
articulat[e] 'one of the most precious rights of our democratic process.' ") (quoting Mervynne v.




unconstitutional.91 Indeed, the recent enhanced use of direct legislation
appears to have called forth a more aggressive judicial policing of the
initiative process and a judicial scrutiny of initiative proposals for consti-
tutional violations. In 1983, the California Supreme Court reversed its
long standing rule of not engaging in pre-election review of initiative pro-
posals and struck a proposition from the ballot on constitutional
grounds.92 In 1984, the same court invalidated a second measure before
it could be submitted to the voters93 and the Florida Supreme Court
twice removed measures from the ballot on constitutional grounds.
94
This judicial enforcement of the federal and state constitutions goes far to
constrain whatever threat direct legislation may pose to minority inter-
ests and individual rights, assuring that direct legislation is no more a
source of "majority tyranny" than the legislature itself.95
91. E.g., Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982); Hunter v. Erickson,
393 U.S. 385 (1969); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assem-
bly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); see also Yelle v. Kramer, 83 Wash. 2d 464, 472, 520 P.2d 927, 932 (1974)
("We reject the contention . . . that appropriate constitutional provisions do not apply to
initiatives.").
92. Legislature v. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d 658, 669 P.2d 17, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1983). Ac-
cording to one scholar, this decision "confirms that state courts will resist strenuously any
majoritarian efforts to limit state constitutional jurisprudence." Fischer, Ballot Propositions: The
Challenge of Direct Democracy to State Constitutional Jurisprudence, 11 HASTINGS CoNs'r. L.Q. 43,
82 (1983).
93. See AFL-CIO v. Eu, 36 Cal. 3d 687, 686 P.2d 609, 206 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1984).
94. See Evans v. Firestone, 457 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. 1984); Fine v. Firestone, 448 So. 2d 984 (Fla.
1984).
95. The real problem for minorities with the initiative process grows out of the limitations of
federal constitutional doctrine. In order to invalidate under the federal equal protection clause a
measure that discriminates against a racial minority, a plaintiff must prove that the measure was
adopted with invidious intent. See Hunter v. Underwood, 105 S. Ct. 1916, 1919-20 (1985); Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-68 (1977). The substantial
difficulties of proving discriminatory intent on the part of legislatures pale in comparison to the
challenge of demonstrating that a ballot proposition was enacted with an invidious purpose. It is far
from clear whose intent is relevant-that of the drafters of the proposal, the thousands who signed
the qualification petitions, or the voters, who can number in the millions. For one court's view of
this problem, see Carman v. Alvord, 31 Cal. 3d 318, 331 n.10, 644 P.2d 192, 199 n.10, 182 Cal. Rptr.
506, 513 n.10 (1982) (stating that the intent of Howard Jarvis, a principal drafter of Proposition 13,
"may deserve some consideration. . . but by no means does it govern our determination how the
voters understood the ambiguous provisions"). In considering recent equal protection challenges to
voter-initiated legislation, the United States Supreme Court has eschewed independent inquiry into
intent and has relied entirely on the findings of the state courts. E.g., Crawford v. Board of Educ.,
458 U.S. 527, 543-45 (1982); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378 (1967).
More generally, minorities may suffer from the limited substantive definition of their rights.
Recent experience has been that few antiminority ballot proposals are adopted in the first instance.
Rather, the electorate usually becomes active only after a state court or state legislature has ex-
panded minority rights beyond the minimum guaranteed by the federal constitution. Antiminority
voters may then seek to roll back those minority gains. This was the pattern in the fair housing
referenda in the 1960s, see generally, Wolfinger & Greenstein, The Repeal of Fair Housing in Califor-
nia: An Analysis of Referendum Voting, 62 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 753 (1968) (analyzing voting behav-
ior and attitudes toward civil rights), and the referenda to repeal municipal gay rights ordinances in
the late 1970s, see Bell, supra note 86, at 18. Unless the repeal itself deprives minorities of a federally
protected right or creates new discriminatory barriers, the minority groups are left without a consti-
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The second constraint on majoritarian abuse lies in the nature of the
initiative process. As Magleby demonstrates, it is difficult to get meas-
ures on the ballot and it is difficult to get them passed. Minority groups
benefit from the "negative bias" in the system. A minority group that
intensely opposes a measure can seek to block ballot qualification and it
can mount a campaign that generates doubts and uncertainties about the
proposition, exploiting the electorate's innate caution and reinforcing the
tendency to reject initiatives even if the proposition appeals to antimi-
nority prejudices. The "negative bias," although a barrier to "good" leg-
islation, functions equally as a shield against "bad" legislation: a defect
of direct democracy may also prevent its abuse.96
In short, instead of being radically different, representative and di-
rect democracy in the United States today suffer in varying degrees from
similar defects of wealth- and organization-based barriers to access, low
levels of popular participation, unreasoned decision making, and poten-
tial for antiminority abuses. The question is whether direct democracy
merely compounds the flaws of representative government or, rather,
whether direct democracy may function as a corrective to the defects in
legislative representation. I believe there is evidence in Magleby's book
and elsewhere which suggests that at least in certain situations, direct
legislation may be more ameliorative than harmful.
tutional claim. See Fischer, supra note 92, at 69-72. Compare Washington v. Seattle School Dist.
No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982) (invalidating initiative that undid school busing program because it
intentionally reallocated political power in a manner more burdensome for minorities) with Craw-
ford v. Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982) (upholding initiative to limit court-ordered busing to
cases mandated by the federal constitution, thereby undoing state court extension of busing as a
remedy for segregation).
96. Thus, opponents were able to defeat a proposal to prevent homosexuals from teaching in
California public schools, notwithstanding widespread prejudice against homosexuals, by calling at-
tention to drafting defects and the lack of due process protection. See pp. 168-69, 183.
It may be that minorities are less adversely affected by voter-initiated legislation than by the
other types of ballot propositions. Voter caution may protect minorities from the antiminority po-
tential of the initiative; however, when minorities are able to make the legislative process work for
them in pluralist textbook fashion, see supra text accompanying notes 86-88, requiring voter ap-
proval after legislative passage may permit popular antiminority sentiment to join with voter caution
to block adoption of such measures. Although voters pass a far higher percentage of ballot proposi-
tions originating in the legislature than of initiatives, about 40% of the legislative measures submit-
ted to the voters fail to obtain the necessary approval. See supra note 66. Requiring voter approval
of a measure which has surmounted all the hurdles internal to the legislative process creates an
additional barrier to the enactment of legislation-a barrier with particularly adverse effects for
minorities. A classic example of such a barrier is the California constitutional provision considered
and upheld in James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), which conditioned the development of low-
rent public housing on voter approval. See also City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426
U.S. 668 (1976) (upholding a city charter provision requiring both city council approval and referen-
dum vote for local zoning variances). Scholars critical of direct democracy because of its implica-
tions for minority interests generally have based their critique on the consequences of requiring voter





Representative government, if it is to be worthy of the name, must
be responsive to the governed. This does not require regular submission
of all governmental policy choices to the voters for approval: in a large,
complex, and heterogeneous society that would be impractical as well as
unwise, for many of the reasons Magleby suggests. Nevertheless, as
Hanna Pitkin put it, "[T]here must be a constant condition of responsive-
ness, of potential readiness to respond." 97 The requirement of periodic
elections may help ensure that elected representatives are responsive to
the wishes of the governed. Yet the imperative of re-election may not
prove to be a sufficient guarantee. Indeed, it may function as a perverse
incentive inducing incumbent representatives to erect barriers to entry to
the political process while also causing them to embrace the programs of
those groups whose wealth and organizational support they will need to
win the next election. The institutional setting, thus, may divide repre-
sentatives from their constituents and create incentives for elected offi-
cials to disregard the preferences of popular majorities.98 This potential
cleavage between the representatives and the represented is well-illus-
trated by legislators' regulation of politics. The legislators' stake in re-
maining in office or keeping their party in power influences legislative
reapportionment, campaign finance regulation, access to the ballot for
third parties and independents, and ethics-in-government laws in ways
that may diverge from the views of most voters. 99
So, too, legislative taxing, spending, and regulatory decisions are
likely to favor those politically active interest groups that are benefited
by government spending or affected by regulation. Like legislators con-
templating the needs of re-election, and unlike the ordinary citizen, these
groups have strong incentives to become deeply involved in the regular
fiscal operations of the legislature. 00 Working through elected officials
who need their campaign contributions, through bureaucrats whose
agencies they work with and support, and through the very force of their
presence in state capitals, these politically active groups strive for pro-
grams that benefit them and block those that do not. Pluralist political
97. H. PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 233 (1967).
98. See generally D. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974) (examining
how the quest for re-election affects representatives).
99. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 120 (1980) (favoring strict judicial review of re-
strictions on the right to vote and of legislative malapportionment because "[wie cannot trust the ins
to decide who stays out").
100. See generally J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1967) (models
for analyzing political organization); W. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE Gov-




theory suggests that the multiplicity of competing interest groups will
ensure that no one interest will dominate the legislature because the
strength of one cluster of lobbyists will be offset by the countervailing
demands of organizations with opposite interests.10 1 These interests,
however, are not always in conflict; many of these groups may support
each other's spending programs, forming coalitions of "high demand-
ers" 10 2 that drive the total level of government taxing and spending
above that preferred by most of the voters. Similarly, interest groups
usually antagonistic to each other may be on the same side in a dispute
over an issue of government regulation. If that is the case, the pluralists'
process of conflict and compromise, of pulling and hauling among inter-
est groups, which is said to result in the virtual representation of the
unorganized will not occur and the unorganized will be shut out of the
legislative process. 103
The best case for direct legislation in a system of representative gov-
ernment is that it may play an important role in just those areas in which
institutional pressures cause representatives to stray from the interests of
popular majorities: government structures and regulation of the political
process, taxation, and spending. An unsystematic review of the evidence
in Magleby's book and elsewhere suggests that initiatives have done just
that. According to Magleby, "A categorization of the more than twelve
hundred initiatives voted on since 1898 would reveal that the. . . subject
areas most apt to result in initiatives are governmental processes and rev-
enue and taxes." 104 Another study concluded that 26% of all initiatives
between 1898 and 1976 involved governmental and political processes-
101. See generally A. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT: A STUDY OF SOCIAL PRES-
SURES (1949) (noting that society is a balancing of many group pressures); R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO
DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956) (examining types of democratic theory); D. TRUMAN, THE GOVERN-
MENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND PUBLIC OPINION (1951) (examining effects of inter-
est groups on political decision making).
102. See Denzau, Mackay & Weaver, On the Initiative-Referendum Option and the Control of
Monopoly Government, in TAX AND EXPENDITURE LIMITATIONS 191, 194 (H. Ladd & T. Tideman
eds. 1981); see also Rothenberg, Discussion of A. T. Denzau, R. J. Mackay, and C. L Weaver, "On
the Initiative-Referendum Option and the Control of Monopoly Government," in id. at 223, 229 (argu-
ing that high demander groups "will only be allies if they coalesce-i.e., form an explicit or implicit
coalition ... that establishes a log-rolling relationship").
103. Environmentalism, at least at its inception, may be one example of this phenomenon. Busi-
ness and labor groups that disagree on most issues of economic regulation often unite in opposition
to measures that might restrict industrial pollution. Such measures, despite broad public support,
frequently become stalled in the state legislature. See, e.g., Lutrin & Settle, The Public and Ecology:
The Role of Initiatives in California's Environmental Politics, 28 W. POL. Q. 352, 360-61 (1975)
(noting combined business and labor opposition to air pollution control measures); see also id. at 362
(noting eight years of legislative inaction on measure to protect California coastline). See generally
G. MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 166-95 (1966) (arguing that






the largest single category of initiatives. 10 5 An additional 21% involved
revenues and taxation-the second largest category. 10 6 A survey that
sought to determine which types of initiatives were "most interesting" to
voters-and thus likely to result in higher turnout and more informed
ballot decisions-concluded that "voters [are] most interested in the
kinds of propositions that they decide most often-government organiza-
tion and revenue and taxation questions." 10 7
Through the initiative process, the voters have acted directly on
matters that professional legislators would have preferred to keep to
themselves. California's Political Reform Act of 1974,108 which regu-
lated campaign finance practices and conflicts of interest, was the result
of direct legislation. 10 9 California and Washington voters initiated meas-
ures concerning legislative redistricting.' 0  The Washington electorate
legislated directly on open meetings, lobbying, and campaign prac-
tices,' and Florida voters adopted a measure regulating ethics in
government. 112
Direct legislation has also been successful in bringing the electorate
into the otherwise relatively closed process of state finance and taxation.
Certainly one of the most well-known initiatives in modern times is Cali-
fornia's Proposition 13,113 the tax-limitation measure adopted in 1978
that may have sparked the "Taxpayer Revolt" of the late 1970s, with
ramifications continuing to this day.' 14 Proposition 13 was followed by a
multitude of tax and expenditure limitation propositions on ballots
throughout the nation." 5 Regardless of the wisdom of constitutional
limits on the size or growth of state budgets, Proposition 13 and its prog-




108. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 81000-81016 (West 1976).
109. See Fair Political Practices Comm'n v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 33, 599 P.2d 46, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 855 (1979) (invalidating parts of the Political Reform Act); Citizens for Jobs & Energy v. Fair
Political Practices Comm'n, 16 Cal. 3d 671, 547 P.2d 1386, 129 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1976) (same).
110. See p. 75 (table 4.5) (redistricting initiatives in the 1960s). In 1983 a reapportionment initi-
ative received enough signatures to qualify for the ballot but was removed because it violated Cali-
fornia's constitutional limitation of reapportionment to once each decade. See infra note 125; see
also Bone & Benedict, supra note 54, at 347 (reapportionment initiative in Washington).
11. See Bone & Benedict, supra note 54, at 347.
112. See FLA. CONST. art. II, § 8 (1976). The provision, known as the "Sunshine Amendment,"
was approved by voters in the November 1976 general election. See Williams v. Smith, 360 So. 2d
417 (Fla. 1978).
113. CAL. CONsT. art. XIII(A) (1978).
114. See CALIFORNIA AND THE AMERICAN TAX REVOLT (T. Schwadron ed. 1984); R. Kur-
NER, REVOLT OF THE HAVEs (1980); A. RABUSHKA & P. RYAN, supra note 22 (discussing the
aftermath of Proposition 13).




eny certainly demonstrate that direct legislation has empowered the elec-
torate to participate more directly in state budget processes. 116
These political and fiscal measures are less subject to the general
criticisms that Magleby levels at the typical initiative.1 17 First, these bal-
lot propositions were sponsored by diverse grass-roots organizations, citi-
zens groups, and taxpayers' associations not ordinarily active, let alone
successful, in legislative politics. They were often vigorously opposed
and outspent by the business and labor groups that Magleby asserts usu-
ally dominate the initiative process. Moreover, surveys indicate that in
the 1970s, which may be viewed as the renaissance of direct legislation,
this participation by political outsiders increased.118 Advances in com-
munications technology may enhance the ability of outsider groups to
qualify proposals for the ballot and increase the possible uses of direct
legislation as an avenue of participation by these interests. 119 Second,
these propositions were often highly controversial and hotly contested.
The voters turned out in relatively high numbers, with drop-off rates
usually below 10%.120
The successful initiative drives often were characterized by factors
that served either to educate the voters or to suggest an element of delib-
eration in the voters' decisions. Proponents of California's Political Re-
form Act conducted sixty public hearings around the state to educate the
voters about the measure's purpose and provisions. l21 Proposition 13
passed only after a decade of unsuccessful efforts by tax limitation activ-
ists, and subsequent efforts to build on Proposition 13 with more draco-
nian tax cuts were also defeated. 122 The voters appear to be able to pick
116. Environmental regulation may also constitute an area where the initiative has played a
significant role in constraining legislative deviation from constituent desires and assuring considera-
tion of measures popular among the voters but less attractive to legislators. Environmental measures
comprise a relatively small percentage of initiative proposals historically-only 7% of the proposals
between 1898 and 1976; they only began to be significant in the 1970s. Ranney, supra note 105, at
78 (table 4-5), 80. A number of important initiatives have focused on problems of environmental
protection and energy conservation. California's first substantive piece of environmental legisla-
tion-The California Coastal Zone Act of 1972, 1972 Cal. Stat. A-I81 (current version at CAL. PUB.
REs. CODE §§ 30000-30900 (West 1977))-was the result of an initiative. Lutrin & Settle, supra
note 103, at 3 63-70. The success of the Coastal Zone initiative was particularly significant because it
was one of the very rare initiatives that passed in the face of heavy negative spending against it. See
Lowenstein, supra note 50, at 529 (noting that opponents outspent proponents $1,185,246 to
$251,308). Other initiative proposals on the California ballot in the 1970s sought to restrict air
pollution and nuclear power plants, while voter-initiated legislation in Maine and Michigan resulted
in restrictions on the sale of nonreturnable bottles and cans. Ranney, supra note 105, at 83.
117. See supra Part I.
118. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
119. See Fischer, supra note 92, at 87.
120. See p. 75 (table 4.5).
121. See id.
122. See A. RABUSHKA & P. RYAN, supra note 22, at 15-21, 159-85. Before Proposition 13, tax




and choose among the tax-cut and spending-limit proposals according to
the merit of the proposition and the state of the economy. Finally, these
measures also usually came before the voters only after prolonged legisla-
tive inaction. The problem of burgeoning property taxes had been before
the California legislature for years before the passage of Proposition 13,
but the legislature had failed to act until it was too late.123 The Califor-
nia legislature also had failed to enact effective campaign finance controls
before the electorate acted. 124 The recent California reapportionment in-
itiative was a response to perceived legislative gerrymandering.
125
In these cases, the initiative served as a remedy for legislative fail-
ure-much as the Progressives had envisioned. Direct legislation did not
serve as a substitute for the legislative process but as a complement when
the legislature had displayed prolonged indifference to the wishes of a
significant portion of the public. The initiative was an effective device for
getting the legislature's attention and reminding representatives of the
public outside the community of political insiders.
Magleby's concern that the initiative will prove too effective and dis-
place the legislature seems unfounded. The difficulties of qualifying
measures for the ballot and overcoming voter resistance to initiative pro-
posals indicate that most laws, even those dealing with subjects prone to
initiative activity, will remain the product of legislative lawmaking.
126
feated in 1968, 1972, and 1973. Id Efforts by Howard Jarvis to follow Proposition 13 with more
draconian cuts were defeated in 1980 and 1984. Jarvis's Proposition 9 on the June 1980 ballot,
informally known as "Jaws II" by its critics, proposed to halve state income taxes, to index the tax
rates to inflation, and to eliminate the tax on business inventories. See id. at 159, 219. It received
only 39% of the vote, see p. 75 (table 4.5), in part because of voters' concern about its economic
effects and in part because legislative tax revision enacted in the aftermath of Proposition 13 reduced
the public's sense of grievance and enhanced belief in "a responsible and responsive state govern-
ment." A. RABUSHKA & P. RYAN, supra note 22, at 160; see id. at 161-83.
Jarvis's Proposition 36 (1984), the "Save Proposition 13" initiative, sought to curtail the ability
of local governments to use special taxes and fees to replace the property tax revenues lost after
Proposition 13. Fifty-five percent of the voters said "no" to Proposition 36. See St. Budget & Tax
News, Nov. 8, 1984, at 1. In the same election, California voters rejected a proposal to cut welfare
spending. See id. at 3.
Tax expenditure limitation measures have received mixed receptions in other states as well. See
generally R. KUTrNER, supra note 114, at 292-324 (recounting diverse fates of tax and expenditure
limitation proposals in Michigan, Oregon, Washington, Ohio, and Florida).
123. See R. KtrrrN'a, supra note 114, at 50-65.
124. See Lutrin & Settle, supra note 103, at 362-63.
125. In a referendum held in June 1982, the voters rejected the district lines drawn by the legisla-
ture in 1981. In a special session in 1982-1983, the legislature adopted a new set of legislative dis-
tricts; California Republicans soon qualified an initiative intended to displace those lines as well.
The California Supreme Court denied that initiative a place on the ballot, finding that the state
constitution allowed only one reapportionment per decade. See Legislature v. Deukmejian, 34 Cal.
3d 658, 669 P.2d 17, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1983). But see id. at 690, 669 P.2d at 40, 194 Cal. Rptr. at
804 (Richardson, J., dissenting) (arguing that the initiative and ballot "constitute the people's only
weapons to dislodge entrenched political dynasties created and sustained primarily by virtue of their
own use and misuse of the reapportionment device").
126. As Professor Lowenstein explains, "[Voters can act cQllectively by means of the initiative
1371
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The legislature is not disabled from acting; in fact, legislative lawmaking
that occurs in the shadow of a vigorous initiative process may be more
responsive to popular wishes than a legislature not subject to check by
direct legislation. Even unsuccessful initiatives have a role, alerting legis-
lators that public concern on a subject that the legislature has neglected
has become great enough to get a measure on the ballot, yet giving the
legislature a grace period in which to move on the matter before the vot-
ers become sufficiently aroused to do it for them.
The initiative cabins the legislature's discretion and ensures that cer-
tain proposals not ordinarily high on the legislative agenda are given con-
sideration, yet still leaves most lawmaking to the more "deliberative,
substantive, and rational" legislative process. Seen from this perspective,
the high hurdles blocking passage of direct legislation may have consid-
erable merit. So long as enough initiatives succeed periodically to
demonstrate the electorate's potential lawmaking power, it is probably
better that most laws emerge from the legislative process, with its greater
capacity for rationality, compromise, care, and deliberation. The legisla-
ture will still write most of the laws, but the existence of the initiative
process as a supplement to the legislature will influence the pattern of
legislative behavior in the direction of greater conformity to popular in-
terests. 127 In states where initiatives are common, "the initiative seems
to have become deeply ingrained in the political culture of the state al-
most like another step in the legislative process. Groups and interests
become accustomed to going the initiative route when the legislature-
governor channel is blocked .... ,,128 Although there is no necessary
virtue to providing a supplemental avenue for legislative losers, the sus-
ceptibility of the legislative channel to "blockage" and to deviation from
the majority when government structure, the political process, and taxing
and spending are at stake will indicate the need for such a mechanism to
assure that proposals unappealing to the legislature but popular with the
people get a fair measure of consideration. The most important function
of direct legislation may not be to pass initiatives-very few citizen-initi-
ated proposals succeed-but to get certain subjects on the legislative
agenda. For poorly organized and underfinanced citizens' groups that
process only episodically and at moments of high political passion . Lowenstein, supra note
67, at 964.
127. Many successful initiative endeavors occurred only after legislative inaction had broadened
the legislative agenda rather than narrowed it. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text. One
political scientist concluded that states frequently using the initiative have legislatures that are at
least as accountable and effective as those in noninitiative states. Indeed, California, the state most
associated with vigorous use of the initiative, was ranked first by the Citizens Conference on State
Legislation in its assessment of legislative performance. See Price, supra note 56, at 255-57.




do not enjoy ready access to the legislative process, this can be a vital
addition to their political resources.
Direct legislation, for all its failings, does seem to provide a means
for mobilizing citizen activism when legislators pursuing their own self-
interests stray too far from what a popular majority conceives of as the
public interest. Although only a minority of initiative proposals fall into
this perhaps idealized category of attempts by political outsiders to check
the legislature, it is a crucial minority because these outsiders ordinarily
would not be heard at all. That most initiatives fail says little about the
quality of the politics that emerges. As Albert Hirschman paraphrased
Robert Dahl in another context, "[T]he ordinary failure, on the part of
most citizens, to use their potential political resources to the full makes it
possible for them to react with unexpected vigor-by using normally un-
used resources of political power and influence-whenever their vital in-
terests are directly threatened." 129 The occasional successes of direct
legislation in areas like campaign practices and taxing and spending are
much more important than the failures. The initiative has value because
it can facilitate the deployment of those "resources of political power and
influence" on the relatively rare occasions when the public is sufficiently
aroused to act, and because even initiative failures shape legislative be-
havior by reminding legislators of the electorate's residual power.
V.
Professor Magleby's book is of enormous value for its collection and
analysis of the empirical research on direct democracy and for its demon-
stration that the initiative falls short of the aspirations of its Progressive
Era sponsors and its contemporary proponents. In the future, scholars
will have to deal seriously with his conclusions concerning financial and
organizational restrictions on ballot access, voter turnout and drop-off,
proposition and handbook readability, and the troubling quality of initia-
tive voter decision making.
I believe he errs, though, in treating direct and representative de-
mocracy as mutually exclusive alternatives and in his idealized view of
how representative democracy functions. Although the shortcomings of
direct democracy that Magleby identifies are real, he overstates its de-
fects while ignoring the possibility that representative democracy suffers
from many of the same problems. His view of direct democracy and
representative democracy as inherently incompatible fails to account for




almost a century of fruitful coexistence in many state political systems
and sidesteps the evidence, admittedly sketchy, that direct legislation
may constrain special-interest domination and check the tendency of leg-
islators to pursue their own self-interest.
Partisans of direct democracy may find the preceding tentative de-
fense of the initiative to be a bit strange. Theorists from Rousseau to the
authors of the Port Huron Statement have focused on direct democracy
as a means of transcending political mechanics by satisfying human
needs as well as providing broad popular participation in lawmaking.1 30
Participatory democracy was urged as a means to give people a sense of
control over their environment, promote solidarity with the fellow mem-
bers of the community, and, by forcing citizens to grapple repeatedly
with difficult civic decisions, develop their intellectual and moral facul-
ties.13' The model of direct democracy has been the small, face-to-face
assembly, working by consensus-the Swiss canton or the New England
town meeting. 32 Indeed, contemporary forms of direct legislation have
been seen as harking back to the tradition of the New England town
meeting. 133 Yet without denigrating the educational and social virtues of
participation, the town meeting metaphor may do the initiative a disser-
vice. It is painfully obvious that none of our states is small enough in
population or area to be analogized to a town, nor can one compare most
contemporary ballot proposition campaigns to meetings. Running town
meetings on a grand but uninformed and undeliberative scale is clearly
not a desirable way to run a state. The town meeting metaphor, however
well-intentioned, suggests that initiatives, like town meetings, cannot
make useful contributions to the effective and responsible government of
a modern state.
34
130. See J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY 3-22 (1980); J. MILLER, Rous-
SEAU: DREAMER OF DEMOCRACY 107-08, 165 (1984); C. PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMO-
CRATIC THEORY 22-44 (1970).
131. Pateman uses the term "political efficacy" for the sense of control over one's environment
that comes from participation. See C. PATEMAN, supra note 130, at 45-66. In the theory of par-
ticipatory democracy, participation is "educative in the very widest sense, including both the psycho-
logical aspect and the gaining of practice in democratic skills and procedures." Id. at 42. Following
Rousseau, Pateman also characterizes participation as "integrative . . .[,j increas[ing] the feeling
among individual citizens that they 'belong' in their community." IaL at 27. Mansbridge emphasizes
the role of "solidarity" and "friendship" in supporting political institutions predicated on face-to-
face assembly and consensus. See J. MANSBRIDGE, supra note 130, at 4-5.
132. See J. MANSBRIDGE, supra note 130, at 39-135 (study of New England town meeting); J.
MILLER, supra note 130, at 41 (citing Swiss cantons as a model of ideal democracy).
133. See City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 672-73 (1976).
134. See, e.g., J. MILLER, supra note 130, at 208 (noting tendency of modern political theorists to
treat direct democracy as "a dream, a utopia, destined not to survive"). Both Pateman and Man-
sbridge are skeptical about the possibilities of broad participation in a large polity, but instead argue
for the expansion of avenues of participation at the local level or the workplace. J. MANSBRIDGE,




But direct democracy can make practical contributions and at least
partly realize the vision of the Progressives. As Woodrow Wilson ex-
plained seventy-five years ago, the initiative was intended "to restore, not
destroy, representative government." 135 He saw the initiative "as a so-
bering means of obtaining genuine representative action on the part of
legislative bodies."1 36 Direct legislation in practice has fallen short of
this ambitious goal. Yet I think Wilson was essentially correct in seeing
in direct legislation, not a threat to legislatures, but a potentially signifi-
cant device for enhancing the representativeness of representative
government. 137
135. Wilson, The Issues of Reform, in THE INITIATIVE REFERENDUM AND RECALL, supra note
8, at 69, 87.
136. Id. at 88. At least one prominent Progressive was very critical of the Wilsonian view of
reinvigorating representative democracy. Herbert Croly dismissed the initiative as "merely another
expression of the old superstitious belief in political mechanics." H. CROLY, PROGRESSIVE DEMOC-
RACY 269 (1914). For Croly direct democracy had "little meaning except in a community which is
resolutely pursuing a vigorous social program." Id. at 270. Without substantive social and eco-
nomic reform, changes in the political structure would do little to liberate the popular will. Indeed,
foreshadowing Magleby, Croly predicted that the initiative process would result in low turnouts and
domination by "alert and energetic voters" to the detriment of the more apathetic or diffuse major-
ity. Id. at 306-08.
137. This defense of direct democracy is based only on an analysis of the initiative. See supra
note 10. The referendum and the requirement of voter approval of legislative enactments present
different issues. Under the latter forms of direct democracy, the legislature plays the critical role of
originating proposals for popular consideration. Thus, the problems of special-interest domination
of the agenda, poor draftsmanship, and unreasoned decisions, which Magleby suggests are endemic
to the initiative, are substantially mitigated. These aspects of the referendum and voter approval are
comparable to actions taken by the legislature without popular participation. On the other hand,
while the appeal of the initiative is that it opens up a new avenue for lawmaking when the legislature
is blocked, the referendum and the requirement of voter approval after legislative passage add a new
barrier at the end of the legislative process. Magleby's statistics suggest that this is a barrier which
effectively blocks many legislative proposals. See supra note 66. Moreover, given the socioeconomic
composition of the electorate that tends to vote on ballot propositions and the apparent voter predis-
position to vote "no," these forms of direct democracy may have a built-in conservative bias. The
distinction between the initiative and a requirement of voter approval requires further exploration,
but not in this already overextended review.
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